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Abstract. We generalize the universally composable definition of Canetti to the Quantum World. The basic idea is
the same as in the classical world. The main contribution is that we unfold the result in a new model which is well
adapted to quantum protocols. We also simplify some aspects of the classical case. In particular, the case of protocols
with an arbitrary number of layers of sub-protocols is naturally covered in the proposed model.
1 Introduction
In recent times, the analysis of complex cryptographic protocols has been getting more and more attention. A
complex cryptographic protocol is a protocol that has a tree of sub-protocols in which any sub-protocol in the
tree calls its children. The leafs are the primitives. In all approaches for the analysis of complex cryptographic
protocols, one simply obtains security results for the primitives, then use these security results to obtain security
results for the parent sub-protocols, and so on until one reaches the root of the tree. In all approaches, this
might be done over a long period of time by many researchers that each publishes their respective results. In
all approaches, a result about a given sub-protocol can be used in a large class of (complex) protocols that call
this sub-protocol. The different approaches only differ in the type of security results that are obtained for these
individual sub-protocols.
Essentially, Canetti’s universally composable definition [11] states that we can replace the sub-protocol with
an associated ideal protocol together with a simulator, and the environment of the protocol (which includes
the parent sub-protocol in the tree) will not notice the difference. The key point that explains the power of
this approach is that, whenever we consider a sub-protocol in the tree, the lower level sub-protocols in the
tree are already replaced by their associated ideal protocols. So, at every stage of the proof, we only consider
sub-protocols that calls ideal protocols, and this makes a big difference when we try to prove the security of a
protocol. Note that Canetti’s model only covered a tree of constant dept because of a technical issue that we
will explain later.
We unfold this basic principle in a different model that is more adapted to quantum protocols. The idea
that the universally composable theorem of Canetti is also valid in the quantum world was previously suggested
in [16]. However, no proof of the theorem or even a model to state the theorem in the quantum world was
provided. The quantum scenario has lead to many surprises in the past, especially because of the extra difficulty
associated with entanglement, and so it was necessary to unfold carefully the universal composability theorem
and the associated model in the quantum world. Our work was first reported in [8]. A protocol in our model is a
set of circuits executed by distinct participants. A circuit is a set quantum registers and a partially ordered set
(POSET) of quantum gates on these registers. As we will see in more details later (see section 3), the POSET
can depend on the value of control registers. As in the classical case, the model must also define environments,
ideal protocols and simulators.
Just deciding what is a useful security result for a sub-protocol in the tree (really only how to define the
result, not how to obtain it) is already a difficult challenge. The principle of simulatability was proposed in the
early 80’s to address this challenge [32]. Essentially, this principle says that if the view of the corrupted parties
can be efficiently simulated by a machine which interacts with an ideal protocol, then these corrupted parties
did not defeat the protocol. So, the idea that the analyzed protocol must be equivalent in someway to an ideal
protocol was already there in the simulatability principle. This principle was used in the early 80’s to define
and prove the security of multiparty computation protocols [32], but no composability result was proven at the
time. The simulatability principle was successfully used again later [21,2,27] and issues such as composition
were considered and partial composition theorems were obtained [2,27].
The universally composable definition of Canetti and its associated universal composability theorem only
came a few years ago [11]. Independently, people at Zurich IBM obtained composability results in a framework
that interestingly can be used with formal methods to automate security proofs [28,29]. Impressively, with
independent work and under the inspiration of [11], they recently obtained a universal composability theorem
[1] in this framework. At the least at this stage, we use the more informal framework of Canetti. The key
element is that these definitions were proven useful (for examples see [12,13,15,29,34,18]).
The notion of security in the quantum world has its own history which we briefly review in Appendix
A. Essentially, the notion of security in the quantum world over the last 20 years used an unstructured or
unrestricted framework for security proofs. In this unrestricted framework, there is no rule except common
sense and mathematics: a security definition can be any property of an analyzed protocol that is potentially
useful (when we traverse the tree bottom-up as previously mentioned). The purpose of this work, first reported
in [8], is to introduce the more structured framework of universal composability in the quantum world. We
will give an example of the difficulties that arise in the unrestricted framework in the next paragraph, but
it will never replace the understanding that many researchers gained through the experience of proving or
trying to prove the security of complex protocols (for example see [12,13,15,29,34,18].) The point is that the
universal composability framework is not just a general proposal for “nice” security definitions. Whether a
security definition is nice or not nice is a matter of taste. The universal composability framework is a practical
framework that allows security results that seem otherwise difficult to achieve. Moreover, it is less error prone.
Of course, our point is that this general framework is also very much needed in the quantum world, perhaps
even more than in the classical word in view of the additional difficulties related to quantum entanglement.
As an example, consider the following key degradation problem. Quantum key distribution protocols requires
classical authenticated channels. All security proofs for quantum key distribution assume that ideal classical
authenticated channels are used. However, in practice, real classical authentication protocols are used, because
there is no such a thing as an ideal authenticated classical channel. The difficulty is that classical authentication
protocols require a small private key initially and very often this small private key will come from a previous
quantum key distribution protocol. Let us assume that sometimes in the past, Alice and Bob met to exchange
an ideal small private key and then went into an alternating sequence of authentication and quantum key distri-
bution protocols, each protocol in this sequence calling the previous one. In this case the tree of sub-protocols
has only one branch which corresponds to this sequence. The question is whether the key generated by this
complex quantum key distribution protocol, this one branch tree, is still secure after n calls to classical authen-
tication and quantum key distribution. This is just an example. The fact is that quantum key distribution will
be used in many other types of application protocols. The universal composability of quantum key distribution
is analyzed in [7]. Obviously, a similar question can be raised for other quantum protocols than quantum key
distribution.
To summarize, our contribution is to unfold the framework of universal composability in a model that is
well adapted to quantum protocols. It is also an interesting alternative model for the universal composability
of classical protocols as well.
2 Basic concepts
In this section, we discuss examples of the five main concepts, the concepts of protocol, application, adversary,
ideal protocol and simulator, and we give the ideas that are crucial in the composability theorem.
2.1 An example of protocol
We start with an example that is all classical, but it will be enough to explain the basic idea. It is a bit
commitment from Alice to Bob that calls an ideal
(2
1
)
-String-OT from Bob to Alice. In a
(2
1
)
-String-OT protocol
from Bob to Alice, Bob has two strings s[1] and s[2] as inputs whereas Alice as a bit c as input. The objective
is that Alice receives the string s[c], but knows nothing about the other string whereas Bob does not know the
bit c, but gets an acknowledgement that Alice has chosen the bit c. An ideal
(2
1
)
-String-OT protocol from Bob
to Alice can be constructed with the help of a trusted party, which we call Charlie. Bob sends the two strings
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to Charlie. Charlie receives the bit c from Alice and sends the string s[c] to Alice. Charlie also acknowledges
to Bob that Alice has chosen c, but he keeps c private. This
(2
1
)
-String-OT protocol is formally defined in
Appendix B.
In the bit commitment protocol, Bob and Alice call the
(2
1
)
-String-OT protocol. To commit a bit x Alice
chooses the string sˆ = s[x] and Bob notes the acknowledgement. The acknowledgement (which is output by
Bob in the string-OT protocol) is an important part of the commitment phase because the protocol would not
be binding otherwise: Alice could wait until much after the end of the commitment phase to choose the bit x
in the
(2
1
)
-String-OT protocol. Later, to open the bit x, Alice announces x and the string sˆ. Bob checks that
sˆ = s[x] to accept or reject the bit. This bit commitment protocol without the
(2
1
)
-String-OT protocol is called
a module. This module calls the
(2
1
)
-String-OT protocol, but it does not contain it. This module together with
the
(2
1
)
-String-OT protocol is the (complete) bit commitment protocol. The bit commitment module is formally
defined in Appendix B.
Thus far, we used the names Alice, Bob and Charlie to refer to some circuits (also called role-circuits) that
are executed inside a protocol. However, a participant executes role-circuits in more than one protocol. For
example, Alice executes a circuit in the bit commitment protocol that we call Alice, but different protocols
have different circuits with the name Alice. To avoid any confusion, in the future, we will often use the
notation SOT-Alice, BC-Alice, etc. to distinguish these different circuits. This becomes important when we
have a complex protocol with many sub-protocols (i.e. many modules), and this is typically the situation where
composable security definitions are very useful.
2.2 Application protocols
A composable security definition essentially states that the analyzed protocol can be replaced by an ideal
protocol and no application will see any significant difference. (We will introduce simulators later.) Let us con-
sider that we ask some individual, a cryptoanalyst, to determine whether or not the proposed bit commitment
protocol is as good as an ideal bit commitment. This cryptoanalyst chooses an application and an adversary
circuit Ar for every corruptible role-circuit r in the protocol. An adversary circuit Ar, also denoted Adv(r),
interacts with the application and the protocol, but is only active when the circuit r is corrupted. The circuit
r is turned off when it is corrupted. The adversary circuit Ar can act in the name of the corrupted circuit r
and it has access to the registers that are normally accessed by r. For example, the cryptoanalyst will choose
an adversary circuit Adv(BC-Alice) to potentially replace BC-Alice and an adversary circuit Adv(BC-Bob) to
potentially replace BC-Bob. With the help of a simple mechanism that we will describe later, the application
can decide at run time which of these two circuits will be corrupted and replaced, if any.
To have a uniform viewpoint on all adversary circuits, we use the rule that every adversary circuit Ar is
associated with a role-circuit r in the protocol. For example, in QKD, we define Eve = Adv(Auxiliary) where
Auxiliary is an extra circuit in QKD (not owned by Alice or Bob). Note that, in some QKD protocols, this
extra circuit could have an active role in the (non corrupted) protocol, for example, to create and share EPR
pairs between Alice and Bob. The set of adversary circuits is called the adversary.
The application is a set of role-circuits that provides inputs to the bit commitment protocol and receive
outputs from this bit commitment protocol. The application can also communicate with the adversary circuits
that are active. The application together with the adversary is called the environment. So, the environment
contains many circuits. Some of these circuits belong to the application. Some others of these circuits belong
to the adversary. The environment together with the protocol analyzed is called the overall setting. Intuitively,
the criteria is that, for every environment, the distribution of a test bit Z is close to an ideal distribution
(associated with an ideal protocol). So, the cryptoanalyst must pick special applications that can dynamically
corrupt circuits, interact with the associated adversary circuits and, finally, output a test bit Z. For example,
it can be a coin toss protocol with additional circuits that corrupt role-circuits (i.e., turn them off and activate
their associated adversary circuits individually) in the protocol using a simple method described later. The
output bit Z of this application can be the outcome of the coin toss.
As we previously mentioned, for a general composable definition, to make sure that no security aspect is
ignored, the cryptoanalyst must consider all possible applications in a large class of applications that may call
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this bit commitment. However, to be concrete, let us only test how well the bit commitment protocol does
when it is called by a coin toss protocol. In this coin-toss protocol, Alice picks a bit x uniformly at random
and commits this bit to Bob. Bob waits for the acknowledgement, then picks a bit y uniformly at random and
announces this bit to Alice. Alice opens the bit x and outputs the bit w = x ⊕ y (the sum modulo 2). Bob
outputs the bit w = x⊕ y if Alice opening is accepted and opens y otherwise. The coin-toss module that calls
bit commitment is formally defined in Appendix B. This coin-toss protocol does not corrupt any party and
does not have any mean to corrupt a party anyway. So, the cryptoanalyst must pick a variation on this coin
toss protocol that corrupt a party.
Let wA and wB be the respective output of Alice and Bob in the coin toss. With a simple mechanism that
we will describe later, a coin toss application can corrupt either Alice or Bob or neither of them. A coin toss
application can corrupt Bob and set Z = wA to test the security against Bob who attempts to find out x before
the opening and create a bias on wA. Another coin toss application can corrupt Alice and set Z = wB to test
the security against Alice who attempts to change the value of x to create a bias on wB . Intuitively, the criteria
associated with these two applications, in both cases, is that there should be no bias on Z. In this way, we have
the two fundamental properties of bit commitment: security against Alice and security against Bob.
2.3 Why we want to consider a general class of applications?
The above discussion suggests that an interesting definition for bit commitment can be obtained even if the
cryptoanalyst considers only coin-toss based applications. If the coin toss protocol is as good when the analyzed
bit commitment is called as when an ideal bit commitment is called, then we must have an interesting bit
commitment. Really, we must have some non-trivial form of bit commitment because otherwise the coins toss
would be biased. If the bit commitment is not binding, a corrupted Alice can create a bias on Bob’s output. If
it is not concealing, a corrupted Bob can create a bias on Alice’s output. So, why do we suggest to consider all
applications? We propose to consider all applications because, even if we have a specific application in mind,
to prove the security of an application protocol, it is often useful to have stronger results about the protocols
that are called by this application protocol. So, the philosophy behind the composability theory is to use strong
security definitions that consider all applications so that at each level the job is easier. As we will see, the job
will be easier because the security statement is very strong: it says that secure sub-protocols can be replaced by
ideal protocols. This philosophy can be useful even if at every level in the tree we have a specific application in
mind, and are not interested in all application protocols. In other words, this is not just a generalization because
we would like to cover all possible application protocols. Moreover, a proof that consider all applications is
not necessarily more complicated because it can be easier to avoid technical details that are associated with a
specific application.
A related point is that we must not assume that a few applications are enough to capture all the security
issues associated with a given task. For example, it is not because the two coin-toss applications that are
discussed above cannot distinguish between the analyzed bit commitment protocol and an ideal bit commitment
that the same is true for all applications. The two coin toss applications are not necessarily representative of
all possible applications that might call the analyzed bit commitment protocol. Composability is a strong
and natural requirement because it says that no application in a large class of considered applications can
tell the difference between the analyzed bit commitment protocol and an ideal bit commitment protocol, not
only specific applications such as the coin toss applications. Of course, it is useful to consider large but yet
restricted class of environments. This implies a restriction on the applications as well. For example, one may
consider computationally restricted environments. Also, typically one must consider environments in which the
application can only corrupt some fraction of the circuits. It is also useful to consider other types of restrictions
on the environments.
2.4 Why the applications output just a single test bit?
Another subtle issue is the fact that our proposed criteria depends only on the probability distribution of a
single test bit Z. Our result easily generalizes to the case where a test string Z is used instead of a single
bit as long as the measure d(PZ, P
ideal
Z
) ∈ [0, 1] that is used to compare the actual distribution with an ideal
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distribution respects the triangle inequality. However, this generalization is problematic because, to be useful,
this generalization will have to be applied systematically for all protocols, and it is more convenient to consider
a single bit. Fortunately, we see from the coin toss applications that it seems that a single bit approach
does already a very good job. Moreover, even if we were to accept the principle that we should compare the
distribution of two strings, in the computational scenario, we will naturally be back to the one bit case. Indeed,
it is typical in the computational scenario to compare two string distributions PZ and P
ideal
Z
by considering a
polynomial time machine that receives one of these two strings as an input and returns a single test bit Z. If for
all these polynomial time machines, the distribution of the test bit Z is the same whether the string Z comes
from the ideal case or the analyzed case, we say that the two cases are computationally indistinguishable. So,
if we consider this polynomial machine as a part of an application, this approach brings us back to the one
bit case. In a non computational scenario, the situation is similar: the single bit case can be used as a natural
way to implement the string case, that is, to compare the distributions PZ and P
ideal
Z
. More precisely, for every
string X ∈ {0, 1}m, we can consider the application that computes the parity bit X⊗Z of the random string Z,
and require that the probability distribution PX⊗Z behaves as in the ideal case. If all the single bit distributions
PX⊗Z behave as in the ideal case, so does the distribution PZ. More precisely, it can be shown that if, for all
X ∈ {0, 1}m, |PX⊗Z(0)− P
ideal
X⊗Z(0)| ≤ ǫ, then ‖PZ − P
ideal
Z
‖2 ≤ 2ǫ, where ‖‖2 is the L2 norm.
2.5 The model: an example
We have seen two coin toss applications based on the coin toss protocol. Here we reconsider these applications
to illustrate in more details the essential of our model and the terminology used. The analyzed protocol is
again the bit commitment protocol with two circuits BC-Alice and BC-Bob for the bit commitment module
and three circuits SOT-Alice, SOT-Bob and SOT-Charlie for the string-OT protocol. The application uses
two circuits CT-Alice and CT-Bob for the coin toss protocol. The adversary contains four adversary circuits
Adv(BC-Alice), Adv(BC-Bob), Adv(SOT-Alice) and Adv(SOT-Bob) that are associated with the corruptible cir-
cuits in the protocol. We recall that SOT-Charlie is not corruptible. The application has access to the test bit
Z and to four corruption registers: C(BC-Alice), C(SOT-Alice), C(BC-Bob) and C(SOT-Bob). In our example,
only BC-Alice will be corrupted. Therefore, only the corruption register C(BC-Alice) and the adversary circuit
Adv(BC-Alice) are needed, but to illustrate the general situation we included all four corruption registers and
all four adversary circuits. With the help of the corruption registers, the application decides when to corrupt a
circuit in the protocol and which one will be corrupted. We assume that every individual gate in each of these
circuits is conditioned by its associated corruption register.
Because it has full control over the corruption registers, the application can turn these corruptible circuits
on and off, and replace them by their respective adversary circuit when they are off. In general, the gates of
a corruptible circuit r in the analyzed protocol are conditioned by a corruption register Cr. The gates of the
associated adversary circuit Ar are also conditioned by the corruption register Cr, but the other way around:
when the circuit r is on, Ar is off and vice-versa.
Note that the worst application (against any analyzed protocol) is the trivial application where every role-
circuit simply forwards back and fourth every input/output message between the analyzed protocol and an
adversary circuit such as Eve that is always active. This means that when we analyze the security of a protocol
and want a security statement that is independent of the application protocol, it is enough to only consider
this trivial case. However, to be concrete, here we made the choice to consider a less trivial application protocol
that includes the cointoss module with CT-Alice and CT-Bob, and we will be consistent with this choice.
Note that, in the partial ordering of the gates in the circuit CT + BC + String-OT, the output wA = x⊕y (in
CT) does not have to occur after the opening (in BC). This is because Bob announces y before the opening and
the generation of the random bit x does not have to occur after the opening. Note that, in a given execution,
wA = x⊕y might occur after the opening, but this is irrelevant because only the constraints that are imposed on
the adversary by the partial ordering of the gates that is defined by the circuit CT + BC + String-OT matters.
Here is how the overall setting proceeds. The output bit wA = x⊕ y is sent to the environment of CT as in the
honest CT protocol. If wA = 1, the application protocol corrupts BC-Alice, that is, it turns off BC-Alice and
turns on Adv(BC-Alice) by flipping the corruption register C(BC-Alice). At this point, the adversary circuit
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Adv(BC-Alice) has access to all the registers of the corrupted circuit BC-Alice, i.e., x and sˆ = s[x], and can
execute the opening in the name of Alice. This adversary circuit computes x′ = x⊕ 1, picks a uniformly picked
random string t ∈R {0, 1}
k and announces (x′, t) to BC-Bob instead of (x, s[x]) as it would normally happen if
Alice was not corrupted. The application sets Z = wB . It is not hard to see that Pr(Z = 0) = (1 + 2
−k)1/2.
2.6 The composability security definition
In the previous example, the environment has created a bias of 2−k/2 on wB toward 0. This bias on wB
toward 0 is not in itself very impressive because we had the power to choose the application that we want in
this environment. In particular, in the application, we were free to directly set wB = 0. However, this bias is
interesting because it allows the environment to distinguish between the (analyzed) bit commitment protocol
and an ideal bit commitment protocol. We will define in details what is an ideal protocol later. It is essentially a
protocol that executes the task perfectly with the help of a trusted party and perfect channels. The goal of the
cryptoanalyst (in other words, the goal of an attack) is not to create a bias on wB or wA or on any other bit,
but to find a test bit Z that detect any difference between the analyzed protocol and the ideal protocol. Even
if Alice is corrupted, as long as Bob is not corrupted, there should be no bias at all in the output wB of the
cointoss if an ideal bit commitment is used in this coin toss application. On the other hand, we just saw that
there exists a bias if the analyzed bit commitment is used. Such a distinction between the ideal case and the
analyzed case would not show up if we used an application in which Bob sets wB = 0 systematically, because
wB = 0 would systematically hold on both the analyzed and the ideal sides. This example is also interesting
because the set of corrupted parties depends on random values in the protocol. In this example, because the
protocol is perfectly secure against Bob, the cryptoanalyst could have corrupted Alice at the beginning — no
one else is interesting to corrupt. However, it is not hard to conceive an example where there is an advantage
to decide later who should be corrupted.
To detect a bias toward 0 on wB , we saw that this application corrupts Alice (i.e. gives her some strategy to
create a bias on xˆ toward xˆ = y). For this application, the criteria that tolerates no bias is Pr(Z = 0) = 1/2. (In
practice, |Pr(Z = 0)−1/2| ≤ ǫ, for some small ǫ > 0 would be fine.) However, we recall that we want to consider
all possible application protocols. The cryptoanalyst could have designed a biased coin toss application where
Alice picks x with distribution (p0, p1) = (1/4, 3/4) and Bob picks y with distribution (p
′
0, p
′
1) = (3/4, 1/4).
In this case, even though BC is almost perfect, the distribution of wB significantly depends on the adversary
circuit. Therefore, the criterion on the distribution of Z, which is used to accept or reject the analyzed bit
commitment protocol, must depend on the environment.
The above discussion suggests that a general criterion on the probability distribution of the bit Z is to
require that, for every environment, the probability Pr(Zanalyzed = 0) ≡ Pr(Z = 0) in the analyzed case is close
to the probability Pr(Zideal = 0) in the ideal case:
|Pr(ZAnalyzed = 0)− Pr(ZIdeal = 0)| ≤ ǫ (1)
where ǫ > 0 depends on the security parameter. This criterion depends on the environment because Pr(ZIdeal =
0) depends on both the environment and the ideal protocol. However, we admit that, at this point, this criteria
is not entirely defined and may seem too strong, too weak or simply obscure because we have not yet really
explained how the reference probability Pr(ZIdeal = 0) can be computed, that is, we have not yet really defined
ZIdeal.
An obvious problem in the definition of ZIdeal is that the internal communication in the ideal protocol is
usually completely different than the internal communication in the analyzed protocol. To be useful, an ideal
protocol should be as simple as possible. An ideal protocol can use hidden (private, authenticated and no traffic
analysis) channels, and a useful ideal protocol will typically do so, whereas the analyzed protocol might not
have access to hidden channels. We cannot ignore the internal communication because the adversary part of
the environment can access it. If the adversary waits for some message and this message does not come because
it is not generated by the ideal protocol, the adversary will jam. If say Z is initially set to 0, it will remain set
to 0 whereas, on the analyzed side, the environment can be designed to swap Z to 1 with some probability. In
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this way, the analyzed protocol will be rejected because criteria (1) is not respected. With this na¨ıve approach,
even good protocols will be rejected.
The solution to this difficulty is to consider a game in which the players are (1) the environment and
(2) a simulator that attempts to generate the information that is not generated by the ideal protocol but is
normally generated in the analyzed protocol and expected by the environment. The ideal protocol and the
simulator, both together, constitute an “extended ideal protocol”. The environment is the same in both sides.
The environment tries to distinguish the analyzed protocol from the extended ideal protocol in accordance with
the criteria (1). If the environment wins, the protocol is not secure. The simulator tries to compensate for
– the missing communication that would normally be generated by the non-corrupted parties in the analyzed
protocol and
– the registers that are normally owned by the corrupted parties in the analyzed protocol
so that the extended ideal protocol and the analyzed protocol cannot be distinguished. If the simulator wins,
the protocol is secure. Note that the missing interaction that would normally occur between the environment
and non-corrupted parties in the analyzed protocol can be separated in two categories. First, there is the
interaction between the environment and the registers that are exchanged between the non corrupted parties
in the protocol. This first type of information depends on the fact that the channels are not private or not
authenticated, etc. Second, there is the interaction that occurs because an adversary circuit Ar acts on behalf of
a corrupted circuit r. This second type of interaction can occur even if the channels are perfect, authenticated,
etc. The point here is that the simulator should compensate for these two types of interaction.
An interesting question can be raised. Why not allowing the adversary circuit to be different on the ideal
side? It turns out that this alternative definition is almost equivalent to the above definition (See Appendix C
for details.)
2.7 The main idea behind composability
Thus far, with the help of an example, we discussed a general approach to define the security of a protocol,
but we have not explained the concept of composability. This situation is natural because, historically, the
notion of simulator and ideal protocol were first used in security definitions independently of the concept of
composability. It is much after that the concept of composability was explained. Here, we use our example to
illustrate the basic idea behind composability, and its relationship with the proposed definition.
In our example, the SOT sub-protocol is an ideal functionality with a trusted circuit SOT-Charlie. A more
complex bit commitment protocol would be obtained if we still used the module BC, but replaced the SOT ideal
sub-protocol with a real sub-protocol RealSOT. Now, suppose that we have successfully shown that RealSOT
securely realizes the ideal protocol SOT in accordance with our proposed security definition. Suppose in addition
that we have successfully shown that the analyzed bit commitment protocol which call the ideal SOT securely
realizes an ideal bit commitment protocol. It is much easier to show the security of BC when it calls the ideal
sub-protocol SOT than if it called the real sub-protocol RealSOT instead. Great, but how useful are these security
results if we want to obtain the security of the real bit commitment protocol that calls the real sub-protocol
RealSOT? The main difficulty is that the security criteria says that the real sub-protocol RealSOT can be
replaced by the ideal sub-protocol SOT, but with an additional simulator. The simulator is a problem because
we have proven the security of BC which calls the ideal SOT without simulator. The main idea behind the
composability definition is that, when we proved the security of bit commitment protocol that calls the ideal
SOT, we considered all environments and, therefore, it is possible to consider that the simulator is a part of
the environment. We see that it is important for the composability aspect of the security definition that the
simulator can be interpreted as a part of the environment. This is the main requirement for composability. It
is also important that the simulator together with the ideal protocol can be interpreted as a protocol, called
the extended ideal protocol, because the original environment (without the simulator) expect an interaction
with a protocol. However, irrespectively of composability, this second requirement is a minimal requirement
for any simulator that is used to prove the security of a protocol RealSOT. It is not specifically related to the
composability aspect of the security definition.
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3 Model for Universal Composability
This Section describes the formal model used to define the composability of classical and quantum protocols.
The motivation for this model was provided in the previous Sections. It should be pointed out that in practice a
protocol corresponds to some source and the protocol in execution is a different concept, a bound protocol. The
source code does not have fixed participants. They are determined in the binding. For simplicity, we assume
that the deployment of the source code into a bound protocol is already executed and we analyse the bound
protocol. This is natural in a circuit based model. To simplify the terminology, because we never use the concept
of a source code anyway, the bound protocol that is analysed is simply called a protocol.
3.1 Protocols
A quantum gate is a unitary transformation on a set of registers. A classical gate is a permutation on the set
of classical values of the registers, a special kind of quantum gate. (The composability theory works fine if a
classical gate is any function, not necessarily a permutation, but then we lose the fact that a classical gate is a
special kind of quantum gate.) A classically controlled gate is a quantum gate of the form
∑
x |x〉
X〈x|⊗UYx . The
unitary transformation UYx is the controlled part of the controlled gate, the classical register X is the control
register and the register Y is the target register. For simplicity, we assume that the control register is always a
single classical bit. In other words, whether the controlled part is executed or not is always precomputed into
a single classical bit, the control bit.
A classical register can be accessed by classical gates and by quantum gates but, in this latter case, only
as a control register or to store the outcome of a quantum measurement (which can be considered as a kind
of quantum gate). A quantum measurement always use a fresh classical register initially set to zero to store
its outcome: no other gate can access this register before the quantum measurement. Therefore, a classical
register can receive the random outcome of a quantum measurement as initial value, but thereafter it can only
be modified deterministically trough classical gates.
A circuit is a set of gates with a partial ordering that depends on the initial value of its control registers. For
every initial value of the control registers, the partial ordering must respect a constraint that we now describe.
For every initial value of every control register, we consider that a controlled gate accesses its target registers
only if its controlled part is active, that is, distinct from the identity. The constraint is that, for every value of
the control registers, every pair of gates that access a same classical or quantum register must be an ordered
pair in the partial ordering. To compute the complexity of a circuit, we only consider controlled gates where
the controlled part is active. Note that such a complexity is a value that depends on the initial value of the
control registers.
A module-role-circuit is a circuit executed by a given participant. A protocol is the union of many module-
role-circuits. Each participant executes one or more module-role-circuits in the protocol. Two distinct module-
role-circuits can share a common register called a channel register. As we will see, the adversary can also access
these channel registers. A communication gate of a module-role-circuit r is a gate of r that accesses a channel
register of r and an activation register associated to this gate. A transmission corresponds to a communication
gate of a sender module-role-circuit that accesses a channel register and, next, the activation register of a (thus
subsequent) communication gate of a recipient module-role-circuit that accesses the same channel register. Only
a communication gate of a module-role-circuit r or a (non-communication) gate of an adversary circuit can
access a channel register. To allow syncronisation there are special gates that are not executed until after an
associated activation register initially sets to SLEEP is set to WAKE-UP by another gate. This corresponds to
the standard approach used in distributed computing in which a procedure sleeps until it is awaken by another
procedure at an appropriate time.
In a well-defined protocol, every channel register has a channel-type and a channel-register-ID that includes
the recipient-ID, the sender-ID and any other information necessary to uniquely identify the channel registers.
The gates of an adversary circuit can access a channel register, but it must be in accordance with its channel-
type. Similarly, we assume that the use of communication gates always respect the constraints imposed by
the channel-type of the channel-register. For example, if the channel-register is classical and authenticated,
the adversary can read it, but cannot change its value. If the channel register is quantum and authenticated,
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the adversary cannot access it. In both cases, the associated activation registers are also authenticated, which
means that only the legitimate module-role-circuits can set them to WAKE-UP.
Note that, without channel-types, a protocol specifies no constraint on the relative order of gates that belong
in distinct module-role-circuits: the sender-ID and the recipient-ID in the channel-register-ID do not have to
respectively correspond to the actual sender and the actual recipient. If the channel registers are authenticated,
an order is usually implicitly imposed by the protocol with the help of the activation registers. However, no
real channel register is perfectly authenticated. In reality, the order is not really fixed: it is only that some test
fails if this implicit order is not respected. Therefore, the union of all module-role-circuits in a real protocol is
not really a circuit: two communication gates that access a given channel register do not have a fixed order.
A corruptible circuit r is a module-role-circuit that contains a special bit Cr called the corruption register.
Every gate in the corrupted circuit r first reads the corruption register Cr and do nothing else if the corruption
register is on. Formally, we consider that every gate G of a corruptible circuit r has the form
G = |0〉Cr〈0| ⊗Ghonest + |1〉Cr〈1| ⊗ I.
As discussed in Appendix D, it is not hard to consider different, more nuanced, types of corruption beyond
fully corrupted and not corrupted at all.
A valid environment E for a protocol P is a choice of order for every pair of communication gates of P
that share a channel register (so that the protocol becomes a circuit in itself) and an additional circuit with
its own set of registers RE that can also access the channel registers and the corruption registers of P and is
such that E+P is a circuit (i.e., for every possible value of the control registers, the union of the two partially
ordered set of gates is also a partially ordered set of gates). The environment contains a special output register
Z and an adversary circuit A(r) for every corruptible circuit r in P . The gates of an adversary circuit A(r) are
like the gates of the corruptible circuit r except that they are active when the corruption register Cr is on and
inactive otherwise. Formally, every gate G′ of an adversary circuit Ar has the form
G′ = |0〉Cr〈0| ⊗ I+ |1〉Cr〈1| ⊗G′corrupted.
An (active) adversary circuit A(r) can access all registers in the set registers RE of the environment and all
registers of the corrupted circuit r. In the application of the constraints of a channel-type, the circuit A(r) can
communicate in the name of r as if it was the circuit r. Note that an adversary circuit can eavesdrop a channel
without using the identity of corruptible circuit r. For example, Eve can eavesdrop the communication between
Alice and Bob without using the identity of Alice or Bob. Note also that we use the rule that every adversary
circuit must be of the form A(r) for some corruptible circuit r ∈ P . For example, Eve = A(Auxiliary) where
Auxiliary is an extra circuit in P = QKD.
3.2 Ideal protocols and simulators
An ideal protocol I(P ) for an analyzed protocol P contains one circuit I(r) for every module-role-circuit
r ∈ P I/O ⊆ P . Formally, P I/O can be any subset of P . However, the ideal protocol will only be realizable if
P I/O contains every circuit r ∈ P that uses an input or an output channel to communicate with the environment.
Note that P I/O will often include the Auxiliary in P , even if it does not contribute to the input/output of the
protocol. We will come back to the special circuit I(Auxiliary) later. The ideal protocol can, and usually do,
contain other circuits beside the circuits I(r), r ∈ PI/O. It typically contains one non corruptible circuit, the
so called trusted party.
A circuit I(r) ∈ I(P ) with r ∈ PI/O is corrupted by the corruption register Cr in the same way as was the
circuit r ∈ PI/O and it can use the input or output communication channels that are normally used by the
circuit r as if it was the circuit r. However, it does not have access to the internal channel of the circuit r. It
uses its own internal channels.
Typically, the ideal protocol I(P ) associated with an analyzed protocol P is much simpler than the protocol
P . It can accomplish the task in a much simpler way because it can use ideal channels and a Non-corruptible
party. In particular, the set of internal channels in the ideal protocol is usually much smaller or less used than
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in the analyzed protocol. Therefore, if we keep the same environment and replace P by its ideal protocol I(P ),
after the corruption of a circuit r, the adversary circuit A(r) in the environment will wait for ever for messages
that will never come, and the output bit Z will never be set as it is set when the environment interacts with
P . Therefore, the two cases will easily be distinguished. So, it is not reasonable to require that P and I(P ) are
not distinguishable in such a direct manner. The solution to this dilemma makes use of a simulator S(P ) that
contains one simulator circuit Sym(r) for every corruptible circuit r ∈ P and one adversary circuit Aideal(r)
for every corruptible circuit r ∈ I(P ). The simulator can contain other circuits.
Each simulated circuit Sym(r) in the simulator, as it is the case with the circuits of a protocol, is associated
with a set of registers. This is necessary to determine which registers can be accessed by the environment
when a circuit gets corrupted. Nevertheless, to simplify the design of the simulator, we allow any circuit of the
simulator to access any register of any other circuit in the simulator. Through the simulation circuits Sym(r),
the simulator can provide the registers and the communication that is expected by the adversary circuits
A(r) in the environment. Through the adversary circuits Aideal(r), the simulator can eavesdrop the internal
communication and impersonate the corrupted circuits in the ideal protocol. In this way, the simulator can be
seen as an extension of the environment. The purpose of the circuits Aideal(r) is to allow the simulator to obtain
information that it needs to accomplish the simulation. The overall purpose of the simulator S(P) is to extend
the ideal protocol I(P ) so that E + P and E + I(P ) + S(P ) are indistinguishable. We have the constraint on
I(P ) + S(P ) that E + I(P ) + S(P ) must be a circuit, that is, the union of the partially ordered sets of gates
for E, I(P ) and S(P ) must still be a partially ordered set, every two gates that share a register must be an
ordered pair, etc. This suggests the following security definition. In this definition, n is a security parameter
used in the protocol, the simulator and the adversary circuits. For example, n can correspond to the number
of photons sent in the protocol. The simulator and the adversary interact with the protocol, so they must also
use the security parameter n.
Definition 1. A protocol P ǫP -securely realizes an associated ideal protocol I(P ) if, for every “valid” environ-
ment E for P , there exists a “valid” simulator S(P ) such that
|Pr(Z(E+P ) = 0)− Pr(Z(E+I(P )+S(P )) = 0)| ≤ ǫP (n,E) (2)
where ZA is the output bit of E in the overall setting A where A = E + P on the analyzed side and A =
E + I(P ) + S(P ) on the ideal side.
Of course, in many cases such a simulator only exists when we restrict the power of the environment. For
example, it is typical to assume that an environment can only corrupt a set of circuits X ∈ X ⊆ 2P where 2P
is the set of subsets of P. The set X is called the access rule.
There is something special about the above definition. The value ǫP is a function of the environment E
which makes it impossible to evaluate because the environment is unknown. Fortunately, this dependence on
the environment E is not needed in the case of unconditional security, i.e., in this case we usually achieve
ǫP (n,E) = ǫP (n). In the case of computational security, there is no way to achieve the above definition with an
ǫP that does not depend on the environment, at the least on its size. This is a problem because an important
aspect of universal composability is to have a security statement that hold for a large class of environments
where the size is unknown. In practice, the only way out of this problem is simply to assume some upper bound
on the size of the environment so that we can evaluate ǫP = ǫP (n, |E|). However, in the security analysis of
a complex protocol with many sub-protocols, each with its associated function ǫ, keeping track of all these
functions ǫ can be cumbersome. So, for convenience, we simply require that ǫP (n,E) is a negligible function
ǫP (n, |E|):
Definition 2. A function ǫ(n, |E|) is negligible (against any polynomial environment E) if, for every polynome
p(n), for every fn ≤ p(n), we have that, for every polynome q(n), for n sufficiently large, ǫ(n, f(n)) ≤ 1/q(n)
or, better, for some α > 0, ǫ(n, f(n)) ≤ 2−αn for n sufficiently large.
The definition in the computational scenario becomes:
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Definition 3. A protocol P of polynomial size computationally realizes an associated ideal protocol I(P ) of
polynomial size (but usually of constant size) if there exist a negligible function ǫP (n, |E|) such that, for every
valid environment E for P , there exists a valid simulator S(P ) of polynomial size such that
|Pr(Z(E+P ) = 0)− Pr(Z(E+I(P )+S(P )) = 0)| ≤ ǫP (n, |E|) (3)
Note that, even though it is not explicitly stated that the environment must be of polynomial size, we need
only be concerned with environment of polynomial size because there is no constraint on ǫP (n, |E|) when |E|
is not bounded by a polynoˆme.
Actually, to obtain a universal composability theorem, very natural conditions are added to this definition.
So natural that it maybe pointless to mention them. Consider the case where many copies of P are used inside
some complex protocol. The polynomial upper bound on the size of the simulator and the function ǫP (n, |E|)
should be the same for all copies of P . In other words, the polynomial upper bound on the size of the simulator
and the function ǫP (n, |E|) should only depend on the protocol definition, not on where the protocol is used
inside an application protocol. Moreover, we restrict the universal composability theorem to complex protocols
that use a finite number of distinct protocol definitions (but it is OK that there are polynomially many copies
of each of them.)
3.3 About the design of an ideal protocol
As we explained, the input/output communication channels that are normally available to a circuit r will not
be used by the ideal functionality when r is corrupted. However, as we previously explained, it is nevertheless
natural to design an ideal protocol that exchanges with the environment (on the analyzed side) or the simulator
(on the ideal side) the information that would normally be exchanged through these corrupted input/output
channels. This is not entirely obvious because, formally, the simulator (or the environment) can only use
adversary circuits Aideal(r) that act in the name of corrupted circuits I(r) when they interact with the ideal
protocol, and thus, because the circuits I(r) are inside the ideal protocol, the simulator only expects internal
communication. Here is how it works. A typical approach to construct an ideal protocol is to use a dummy
party I(r) in the ideal protocol for each circuit r that participates in the input/output functionality of the
analyzed protocol. A dummy party I(r) just plays the role of a channel between Aideal(r) and a trusted party
Charlie ∈ I(P ) that computes alone the functionality of the ideal protocol. Any input received by a dummy
party is sent to the trusted party and this trusted also use these dummy parties to return an output. In
this way, when the dummy circuit I(r) is corrupted, the adversary circuit Aidealr can exchange input/output
communication with the trusted circuit in the ideal protocol.
Despite the fact that the simulator can only interact with the ideal protocol in the name of a corrupted
party, if it help in the design of the simulator, a circuit in the ideal protocol can exchange any information
with the simulator (on the ideal side), even if no circuit in the analyzed protocol is corrupted. This exchange
can be done through the circuit Devil = AIdeal(Auxiliary) in the simulator, where Auxiliary is an extra
circuit in the protocol. For example, this extra circuit can be the same Auxiliary that is used in the definition
Eve = Adv(Auxiliary) in QKD.
Note that I(Auxiliary) in I(r) does not have to be passive. It can communicate with the trusted circuit in
I(r), even if the circuit Auxiliary is passive in r. We recall that the environment of the ideal protocol on the ideal
side is the simulator. Because a more powerful simulator makes a security proof easier, we want an ideal protocol
that gives as much power as possible to the simulator but we must respect the fact that the ideal protocol must
be useful when used inside an analyzed protocol. The circuit I(Auxiliary) must be defined accordingly. As a
part of a security proof, an analyzed protocol can contain ideal sub-protocols. In this case, the environment of
the ideal protocol is the environment of the analyzed protocol. So the environment communicates with these
ideal sub-protocols when they are on the analyzed side. If this exchange of information with the ideal protocol
is fine in that scenario, then it is a valid communication. So, this exchange of information between the trusted
circuit and I(Auxiliary) must respect the spirit of the task. For example, an ideal bit commitment should
not unveil the bit that is committed before the opening, but it is fine that the trusted circuit in the ideal bit
commitment protocol tells the circuit AIdeal(Auxiliary) that Alice has decided to open the bit, even if no party
is corrupted.
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4 The universal composability theorem
Any variation on the universal composability theorem is useful when we consider protocols P that have many
sub-protocols. A sub-protocol Q of P has the recursive form
Q =M(Q) +
∑
R∈C(Q)
R
where C(Q) is the set of sub-protocols of Q that are called by its main module M(Q). If Q is a primitive then
there are no sub-protocol R in the sum and Q =M(Q). As we explain in Appendix E, we can rewrite a protocol
where the set of modules is a directed acyclic graph, not a tree, as a protocol that is a tree. So, we do not lose
generality when we assume that a protocol is a tree of modules. Let I(Q) be the ideal protocol associated with
Q. Let
Q˜ =M(Q) +
∑
R∈C(Q)
I(R).
Here is the composability theorem.
Theorem 1. Computational scenario: If, for every sub-protocol Q of a protocol P , Q˜ computationally realizes
I(Q), then P computationally realizes I(P ). Unconditional scenario: If, for every sub-protocol Q of a protocol
P , Q˜ ǫQ˜-securely-realizes I(Q), then P ǫP -securely-realized I(P ) where ǫP =
∑
Q ǫQ˜.
Instead of directly proving the theorem, we will describe a proof technique that should be used if one wants
to keep track of the function ǫ (see previous section). This will lead us to a variation on the universally
composability theorem which is more complicated, less practical, but for which the proof is trivial. Then, it
will be easy to explain how the proof must be modified to consider the unconditional scenario, and similarly
for the computational scenario.
In the proposed proof technique, we assume that, for every sub-protocol Q (in the tree of sub-protocols) of
P , we have that Q˜ ǫ
Q˜
-securely realizes I(Q) where ǫ
Q˜
= ǫ
Q˜
(n,E(Q˜)). The proof technique does not explain
how to obtain this hypothesis. It explains how to use this hypothesis to obtain that P ǫP -securely realizes I(P )
for some function ǫP = ǫP (n,E(P )).
As explained before, any approach uses a bottom-up traversal of the tree of sub-protocols of P . The natural
way to use (2) or (3) is that, at every node Q in the bottom-up traversal, the protocol Q˜ is replaced by
I(Q) + S(Q˜). This is because (2) or (3) essentially says that we can do this replacement. The simulator S(Q˜)
for a given the environment E(Q˜) is obtained using the hypothesis that Q˜ ǫ
Q˜
-securely realizes I(Q). For the first
Q in the bottom-up traversal, we have E(Q˜) = E(P ), the original environment. However, as we do replacements,
simulators and ideal protocols are added in the environment E(Q˜) of the visited protocol Q˜. Nevertheless, for
E, P , n and Q fixed, E(Q˜) is a well defined circuit.
Before the first replacement, the entire setting is E + P . After the last replacement, the entire setting
is E + I(P ) +
∑
Q S(Q˜). Using the triangle inequality for each replacement, we obtain that the simulator
S(P ) =
∑
Q S(Q˜) is the required simulator such that
|Pr(Z(E+P ) = 0)− Pr(Z(E+I(P )+S(P )) = 0)| ≤ ǫ(n,E) (4)
where ǫ(n,E) =
∑
Q ǫQ˜(n,E(Q˜)). For this last sum to make sense, we need that, for P fixed, ǫQ˜(n,E(Q˜)) is a
function of n, E and Q. This is the case because E(Q˜)) is a function of n, E and P : it contains ideal protocols
and simulators that can be determined given the security definition of the sub-protocols R˜ with R < Q in the
traversal order. So, we have proven the following variation on the universal composability theorem.
Theorem 2. If, for every sub-protocol Q of a protocol P , Q˜ ǫ
Q˜
-securely-realizes I(Q), then P ǫP -securely-
realized I(P ) where ǫP (n,E) =
∑
Q ǫQ˜(n,E(Q˜)) in which, as explained above, ǫQ˜(n,E(Q˜)) is a function of n,
E and Q.
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A problem with this variation on the universal composability theorem and in the way to use it as a proof
technique is that the description of the function ǫ
Q˜
(n,E(Q˜)) requires that one keeps track of all the simulators
and ideal protocols in E(Q˜). If researchers were to use this theorem as a proof technique, an intermediary
security result for a sub-protocol Q˜ would have to include a complete description of the simulator S(Q˜) used,
and the final security result would be expressed in terms of a summation
∑
Q ǫQ˜(n,E(Q˜)) which cannot be
simplified because each ǫ
Q˜
can depend on different aspects of the environment E. Fortunately, this issue
disappears in the unconditional scenario case because ǫ is independent of the environment and theorem 2 gives
us theorem 1. In the computational scenario, if we want to know ǫ, which at some point one will want to know,
the only way out of this issue is to restrict ǫ to be a function of the size (or other simple aspects) of E and
then make concrete assumptions so that the different ǫ
Q˜
can be computed.
If we just want to know that ǫ is negligible as in definition 3, the way to take care of this issue in the
computational scenario is subtler. We need to show that ǫP (n,E) =
∑
Q ǫQ˜(n,E(Q˜)) is negligible given that
each ǫ
Q˜
(n,E(Q˜)) is negligible. We must guarantee that |E(Q˜)| is of polynomial size because otherwise the
fact that each ǫ
Q˜
(n,E(Q˜)) is negligible cannot be used. At this point, we simply use the fact that there are
only a constant number of distinct protocol definitions Q˜ in the protocol P , and each has a simulator with a
polynomial upper bound on its size that depends only on the definition of Q˜. We obtain that there exists a
single polynome p(n) that bounds the size of each of the polynomially many simulators in E(Q˜). Similarly, we
must have a single lower bound for all the α in the statement that all ǫ
Q˜
are negligible. Again, we use the fact
that that there are only a constant number of distinct protocol definitions Q˜ in the protocol P and so only a
constant number of distinct ǫ
Q˜
.
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A History of security definitions for quantum key distribution
For a long time, researchers only considered attacks that interact with a single photon or few photons at a time,
the individual attacks (for examples see [4,5,26,20,3,23]). A special interesting case are the collective attacks
where the interaction is with a single photon at a time with a different probe for each photon, but there is a
final measurement on all the probes together at the end [9]. The security notion for quantum key distribution
was simply that, for all (individual or collective) attacks that have an error rate below some finite threshold,
Eve’s information must be below some associated finite threshold. A private key could then be extracted with
standard privacy amplification techniques [6]. These privacy amplification techniques being taken for granted,
researchers considered the disturbance/information trade-off as the basic ingredient in the security analysis of
quantum key distribution protocols [19].
This works fine for individual attacks. For non individual attacks, the formal notion of error rate or distur-
bance is tricky. For example, with probability 1/100 Eve could intercept all photons and otherwise do nothing.
The error rate after this attack is 1/100, but yet no privacy amplification techniques can succesfully extract
a private key. Because of this difficulty and the possible entanglement between photons created by a non
individual attack, the security of quantum key distribution against all attacks was difficult to prove.
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The first security result against all attacks was obtained in [33] for the quantum oblivious transfer protocol
of [17]. Later, this result was adapted in [24] for the quantum key distribution protocol of [4]. Even at the
time, without any reference to quantum error correction, the basic result was that, if the number of phase flips
(i.e., bit flips in the complementary basis) in the raw key is small, then privacy amplification works. A similar
property is needed in the proofs that are based on Quantum Error Correction (for example, see [31]). The main
point is that we could use the number of errors in the raw key, including phase flip errors, as a measure of
Eve’s information before privacy amplification. A small number of phase flip errors was called the small weight
property [33], and later the small sphere property [24].
Note that it is not enough that the expected phase flip error rate is small, below some fixed small threshold.
Privacy amplification only works when the actual number of phase flip errors, not just its expected value, is
below some small threshold. For example, in the above simple attack, the expected phase flip error is 1/100, but
privacy amplification does not work irrespectively of whether or not 1/100 is below any threshold. The solution
is to define Eve’s success as the event where the number of bit flips on tested photons is small and the number of
phase flips on the other photons is large. This leads to a new notion of security: it is not possible for Eve to both
pass the test and have information at the same time. So, the criteria is of the form Pr(Pass ∧ Info > µ) ≤ ǫ
where Info is some variable that determines how much information Eve has.
Equivalently, the above criteria can be written Pr(Pass)×Pr(Info > µ|Pass) ≤ ǫ, for some ǫ, µ > 0. Note
that we can set Info = 0 when the test fails because no key is generated. So, in a way, the key point is that
we must consider separately the case where the test passes and the case where the test fails, and average over
the two cases. Note that the case where Eve fails the test corresponds to a key of lenght zero. This suggests
a generalization of the above notion: the key point is to consider each possible lenght of the key separately,
and average over all possible length. This is in accord with the old principle that in key distribution it is
acceptable that Eve’s learn the length of the key. (Otherwise, it is like adding the extra condition that no
traffic analysis is possible, but this might not be achievable with unconditional security even in the quantum
world.) If we apply this principle to mutual information, the privacy condition becomes I(KA,KB ;VE |M) ≤ ǫ
where KA,KB are the respective keys of Alice and Bob, VE is Eve’s view and M is the lenght of the key. We
recall that I(KA,KB ;VE |M) =
∑
m Pr(M = m)× I(KA,KB ;VE |M = m).
At the same time that the general principle of conditioning over the length of the key was proposed, it
was realised that a small value for I(KA,KB ;VE |M) is not sufficient for privacy (for example, see [25,22].) For
example, in principle, Eve could have an attack in which she forces the key to be a string of zeros. She would
not have to receive any data, i.e., the conditioned mutual information I(KA,KB ;VE |M) would vanish, and yet
Eve would know the key. If this key is used in a one-time-pad, there is no privacy at all. So, an extra condition
was added for privacy called the uniformity: the distributions of both KA and KB must be near uniform
(conditioned by M as we explained above). For example, the criteria for the uniformity of the distribution PKA
of KA given M = m can be the variational distance ‖PKA − 2
−m‖1 =
∑
k∈{0,1}m |PKA(k) − 2
−m|. In this case,
after we condition over M , the uniformity condition becomes
∑∞
m=0 Pr(M = m)× ‖PKA − 2
−m‖1 ≤ µ.
Note that, if we measure non uniformity with the formula m−H(KA|M = m), where H(KA|M = m) is the
entropy of KA given M = m, it is possible to combine small mutual information and uniformity into a single
privacy condition [25,22]:
∑
m Pr(M = m)(m − H(KA|VE ,M = m)) ≤ η = ǫ + µ where H(KA|VE ,M = m)
is the entropy of KA conditioned by the random variable VE given the event M = m. Of course, it is always
understood that we must also have the correctness condition: Pr(KA 6= KB) ≤ β. In this case, conditioning
over M makes no difference because
∑
m Pr(M = m) Pr(KA 6= KB |M = m) = Pr(KA 6= KB).
B The formal protocols
In this Section, we formally describe the modules used in this document.
(Ideal) SOT
1. SOT-Bob: For i = 0, 1 do {receive input (s[i] ∈ {0, 1}k) from App; send s[i] to SOT-Charlie; };
2. SOT-Charlie: For i = 0, 1 do { receive s[i]; };
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3. SOT-Alice: receive input c ∈ {0, 1} from App; send c to SOT-Charlie;
4. SOT-Charlie: receive c; send OK = “ok” to SOT-Bob;
5. SOT-Bob: receive OK; send output OK to App ;
6. SOT-Charlie: send sˆ:=s[c] to SOT-Alice;
7. SOT-Alice: receive sˆ; send output sˆ to App;
In the ideal
(2
1
)
-String-OT module, the channels are all hidden. The bit commitment (BC) protocol calls
the
(2
1
)
-String-OT protocol. Here is the BC module.
BC on top of SOT
Commit Phase
1. BC-Bob: For i = 0, 1 do { picks s[i] ∈R {0, 1}
k ; send input s[i] to SOT-Bob; }
2. BC-Alice: receive input x ∈ {0, 1}; send input x to SOT-Alice
receive output sˆ from SOT-Alice;
3. BC-Bob: receive output OK from SOT-Bob; send output OK to App;
Opening
4. BC-Alice: receive input FOO ∈ {0, 1} from App; send (x, sˆ) to BC-Bob;
5. BC-Bob: receive (x, sˆ) from BC-Alice; If (s[x] = sˆ) do { {xˆ := x} } else { xˆ :=⊥ }; send output xˆ to App;
In the BC module, all channels are hidden except the unique send/receive channel which is used by
BC-Alice to send the opening information (x, sˆ) to BC-Bob. This is a public but authenticated channel. Here
is the CT protocol.
CT on top of BC
1. CT-Alice: picks x ∈R {0, 1}; send input x to BC-Alice;
2. CT-Bob: receive output OK from BC-Bob; picks y ∈R {0, 1}; send y to CT-Alice;
3. CT-Alice: receive y from CT-Bob ; send output x⊕ y to App; send input “open” to BC-Bob;
4. CT-Bob: receive output xˆ from BC-Bob; send output xˆ⊕ y to App;
In the CT module, all channels are hidden except the two public but authenticated send/receive channels
which are used by BC-Bob and BC-Alice to send xB and xA, respectively.
C Equivalence with an alternative definition
It may seem that only the application should be the same on both sides, not the adversary. After all, we saw
that the only purpose of the ideal side is to determine the probability Pr(ZIdeal = 0) that is acceptable in (1).
It should not matter that the adversary is different on the ideal side. Consider the alternative definition where,
on the ideal side of the game, Pr(ZIdeal = 0) can be computed with a different adversary than on the analyzed
side. This alternative definition reads as follows. The protocol is secure if, for all applications App and adversary
Adv for P , there exists an ideal adversary Adv′ such that ZAnalysed and ZIdeal cannot be distinguished, where
Analysed = App + Adv + P and Ideal = App + Adv′ + I(P ). In the original security definition (without the
extra existential quantifier on the adversary), we had Ideal = App + Adv + S(P ) + I(P ). In the alternative
definition, the simulator is part of the ideal adversary: two consecutive existential quantifiers can be replaced
by a single one. This alternative definition is fine because, if the ideal protocol I(P ) is really ideal, no matter
what is the ideal adversary Adv′ on the ideal side, the probability Pr(ZIdeal = 0) should still be a good reference
value. However, in this document, we consider that the adversary is the same on both sides. Certainly, the fact
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that our security definition avoids this extra existential quantifier can only make it stronger (more restrictive
on the protocols) because it simply means that we have less freedom for the acceptable value of Pr(ZIdeal = 0)
in (1), that is, less freedom to accept the protocol. In the following, we essentially prove that the fact that
our security definition avoids an extra quantifier on the adversary on the ideal side does not make it strictly
stronger, and so these two definitions are essentially equivalent.
We say “essentially” because there is a subtle issue. The proof that the alternative definition is equivalent
only works if, in this alternative definition, “all environments” means “all environments in which the application
App is allowed to interact with registers that are exchanged between non corrupted circuits in the protocol in
accordance with their security type”. In the original definition (without the extra existential quantifier), these
two classes of environments have the same power, but we do not know this as a fact in the alternative definition
with the existential quantifier on the adversary on the ideal side. Therefore, it seems that the alternative
definition (with the existential quantifier on the adversary) might actually be weaker (less restrictive on the
protocols) if we do not allow the application to interact with the registers that are exchanged in non secure
channels between the non-corrupted parties in the protocol. Because, by definition, the application does not
include the adversary circuits, this is a reasonable constraint on the application (even if the channels are
public!.)
The proof proceeds in three steps. First, we show that, in the original definition (without the extra existential
quantifier), a protocol is accepted against all environments in which the application cannot directly interact
with channel registers if and only if it is accepted against all environments in which the application can directly
interact with channel registers. In other words, in the original definition, allowing the application to directly
interact with channels registers does not make the environment more powerful. For the two other steps, when
we say “all environments” we mean “all environments in which the application is allowed to directly interact
with channel registers”. In the second step, we show that with the original definition, if a protocol P is accepted
against a sub-class of all environments E′ that only use a dummy adversary (defined later), then it is accepted
against all environment E. Third, we show that every protocol P that is accepted by the alternative definition
(with the extra existential quantifier) is also accepted by the original definition against the environments with
the dummy adversary. There is a subtle point here. This shows the equivalence of the two definitions, but only if
in the alternative definition (with the extra existential quantifier) “all environments” means “all environments
in which the application is allowed to directly interact with channel registers”.
First step. The environment can simulate an interaction between the application and channel registers because
the application can send a probe register to the adversary which can use it as an ancilla to interact with a
channel register and then return the probe register back to the application. So, allowing a direct interaction
between the application and channel registers does not make the environment more powerful.
Second step. The strategy for the second step is that, for every environment E for P , we construct an environ-
ment E′ for P with a dummy adversary, obtains the simulator S against E′ and show that it works also against
E. A dummy adversary is an adversary that only contains communication gates that are executed between the
application and itself or between itself and the protocol. With these gates, a dummy adversary does nothing
except forwarding back and fourth the communication between the application and the protocol. We construct
the dummy adversaryDummy in E′ in the following way. Let P be the protocol and Adv the adversary in E. We
recall that the protocol P communicates with the adversary Adv. We denote the communication gates in Adv
between Adv and P , the Adv-P communication gates. An Adv-P communication gate is a gate of the adversary
that access a channel-register that is received by a module-role-circuit of P . Let Dummy be the circuit that
contains two Dummy-P communication gates for each Adv-P communication gate: one for reception and the
other one for forwarding. Let SAdv be the same as the adversary Adv except that each Adv-S communication
gate is replaced by a corresponding an App-Dummy communcation gate. So, SAdv + Dummy is essentially
the same as Adv, except that every Adv-S communication gate is replaced by three communication gates, one
in SAdv and two in Dummy. The totality of the application in E′ is App′ = App + SAdv. The circuit SAdv
can be interpreted as a simulation of Adv inside the application. We have constructed E′ = App′ +Dummy.
It is useful to picture the situation in terms of a graph where the nodes are the gates in E + P with
E = App + Adv and the arrows are the ordered pair of gates in the associated POSET. In this picture, we
17
obtain E′ + P where E′ = App′ +Dummy in the following way. Every arrow between Adv and P is now an
arrow between Dummy and P . This is because Dummy is the new advesary that replaces Adv. Moreover, for
each such arrow, we replace the arrow between Adv and P with an arrow between Adv and Dummy, reinterpret
Adv as SAdv, and add another arrow inside Dummy from the reception to the fowarding gates. We cannot
create a cycle in this way. So, any valid environment E correspond to a valid environment E′.
To end this second step, we must construct a simulator S against E. By hypothesis, there exists a simulator
S against E′. This simulator that is valid with E′ is also valid with E because, replacing any two consecutive
arrows with an intermediary step in the dummy adversary by the original single arrow cannot create a cycle.
Second, with this same simulator, the computation is the same with E or E′. So, if S succeeds against E′, it
also succeeds against E. This concludes the second step.
Third step. Consider a protocol P that is accepted by the alternative definition (with the extra quantifier).
We must show that this protocol is also accepted in the original definition against all environments E′. So,
for a given E′ = App′ +Dummy, we must find S such that ZE′+P ≈ ZE′+I(P )+S. By hypothesis, because E
′
is a valid environment against P , the protocol P is accepted against E′ in the alternative definition with the
extra quantifier. So, we have that there exist an adversary Adv′ and a simulator S′ so that ZApp′+Dummy+P ≈
ZApp′+Adv′+S′+I(P ). We define S so that App
′ +Adv′ + S′ and App′ +Dummy + S are equivalent. Essentially,
S is identical to Adv′ + S′, but it communicates with the dummy adversary Dummy instead of directly with
App′. We have that ZE′+P ≈ ZApp+Dummy+S+I(P ) = ZE′+S+I(P ). This concludes the proof.
If we go back to our coin toss environment example, this means that we can consider that the adversary on
the real side which creates the small bias 2−k is in fact a simulated adversary which communicates with the
real protocol through a dummy adversary, but the simulator on the ideal side is like an adversary that freely
interacts with the ideal protocol and try to play the role of the dummy adversary, and tries to compensate for
differences between the ideal and the real protocols – a difficult job because the dummy adversary is the worst
adversary.
D More about the adversary status
Usually, the computational basis states of a corruption register C(U) are the states |NOT CORRUPTED〉 and
|FULLY CORRUPTED〉. However, we will see that we can have different levels of corruption such as HONEST BUT
CURIOUS. The initial state of every register C(X) is |NOT CORRUPTED〉. The gates of every circuit U ∈ P are
always conditionned by the register C(U). If the register C(U) is FULLY CORRUPTED when U is activated and
ready to execute a gate Gi, the gate Gi is ignored. The next time that it will be activated, the circuit U will be
ready to execute the next gate Gi+1 (which will also be ignored if C(U) remains CORRUPTED). The environment
has access to the registers of a FULLY CORRUPTED circuit and can communicate in its name. A circuit is HONEST
BUT CURIOUS, if it is not turned off but the environment can read its classical registers. A circuit is FAIR BUT
CURIOUS, if it can be replaced by an equivalent circuit (no difference can be seen by the environment unless it
reads its classical registers) and the environment can read its classical registers. Also, a circuit might not be
forced to give its registers when corrupted. A circuit that is fully corrupted except that its register are kept
private is CORRUPTED WITHOUT MEMORY. In the following we will restrict ourselves to NON CORRUPTED and FULLY
CORRUPTED circuits.
E The directed acyclic graph case
If the graph of sub-protocols is a rooted directed acyclic graph instead of a tree, an ideal protocol I(Q) for a
sub-protocol Q in the graph can be in the intersection of two protocols R˜ and S˜ with R < S in the traversal
order. After we replace R˜, which includes I(Q), we have the problem that I(Q) is not available anymore for S˜.
Fortunately, this situation will typically occur with a sub-protocol Q that is designed so that it still provide
its functionality I(Q) even after it is called by R. We must use this fact to reorganize the protocol so that it
becomes a tree of sub-protocols instead of a directed acyclic graph. For every sub-protocol Q that is called by
many sub-protocols R1 < . . . < RnQ , nQ > 1, starting with those with the longest path from the we do root,
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we do the following. Without loss of generality, we assume that the nodes Ri are ordered by the lenght of the
longest path from the root to Q in which they belong. For i = 1, . . . nQ, we redefine the ideal protocol of Ri as
I ′(Ri) = I(Q) +
∑i
j=1 I(Rj), we let Ri+1 call Ri instead of Q and every protocol T that calls Ri must now call
Rm which is the latest Rj , with j ≥ i, that occurs before T in the traversal order.
The hypothesis of the universal composability for the new tree will have to be proven. This may seem a
difficult task because of the apparent complexity of the new ideal protocols I ′(Ri). However, this complexity
is only superficial. The protocol Ri+1 only uses I(Q) inside I
′(Ri) and any other protocol that called Ri but
now calls Rm, only uses I(Ri) inside I
′(Rm). This suggests that whenever we have a directed acyclic graph of
sub-protocols, there are good chances that we can reorganize it as a tree and still be able to use the universal
composability theorem.
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